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Abstract
Consider agents who undertake costly effort to produce stochastic outputs observ-
able by a principal. The principal can award a prize deterministically to the agent
with the highest output or to all of them with probabilities that are proportional
to their outputs. We show that the deterministic prize elicits more (expected, to-
tal) output when agents’ abilities are evenly matched, otherwise the proportional
prize does better. Therefore if agents’ characteristics are sufﬁciently diverse com-
pared to the noise on output, and are not heavily correlated (e.g., because they
are picked i.i.d.), then the proportional prize will elicit more output. We in fact
show that this is the case when any Nash selection (under the proportional prize)
is compared with any individually rational strategy selection (under the deter-
ministic prize), provided agents know each others’ characteristics (the complete
information case). When there is incomplete information, the same conclusion
holds (but now we must restrict to Nash selections for both prizes).
In the event that the principal knows the distribution of agents’ characteristics,
we also compute the optimal scheme for awarding the prize (among all schemes
conceivable).
JEL Classiﬁcation: C70, C72, C79, D44, D63, D82.
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11 Introduction
Consider a principal who has hired several agents to work for him. Each agent can
undertakecostlyunobservableefforttoproduceastochasticobservableoutputthat
the principal values. The principal, in exchange, has a pot of gold that is valued
by the agents. The question is: how should the principal award the gold in order
to elicit maximal expected output from the agents? Should he give all the gold to
the best performer? Or should he divide it into k successively smaller parts and
award these as 1st;2nd;:::;kth prizes to the agents based upon the rank-order of
their outputs? Or is there something else the principal can do?
We propose the following simple scheme. Let the principal “market” the pot
of gold to the agents, on the understanding that they must pay for it with the
output they have produced. How the gold gets allocated is then left to market
forces. Indeed, suppose that agents 1;:::;n have put up supplies of x1;:::;xn units
of output (perhaps all they have produced, if they do not value the output per se
but only the gold it can buy); and that the principal has put up y units of gold on
the other side of the market. The only price p (of the output, in terms of gold)
which will “clear” the market is1 p = y=(x1+:::+xn), and this is tantamount to
handing out y to the agents in proportion to the quantities they have supplied.
We compare the “marketed prize” to the single prize which, in turn, is often
better than multiple a priori ﬁxed prizes (see Remark 3 in Section 8). Our main
result is that, on balance, the marketed prize elicits more expected total output
from the agents than the single prize.
This result can be transported to an entirely different sceanrio in which the
participants in a contest are to be handed out a coveted indivisible prize, based
upon their performance. What is needed is that the performance be susceptible to
quantiﬁcation via “scores”. There are many situations where this, in fact, is the
case. For instance, a manager can consider total revenue earned as the yardstick
whereby to award the badge of honor, or promotion to a higher echelon, to the
best salesman of the year. In a race, the time taken to complete it comes naturally
to mind. Sometimes scores are of a more subtle structure: in a gymnastics contest
each member of a jury gives subjective scores to different aspects of performance
which are then aggregated to come up with ﬁnal scores. (The reader can think
of other examples.) One upshot of assigning numerical scores, and perhaps the
reason why they are so prevalent, is that they enable us to judge not only who beat
whom, but by how much. Was the race keenly contested or one-sided? What was
1the total demand for gold is px1+:::+ pxn which must equal the supply y
2the margin of victory? These are questions that are often not without meaning,
and amenable to plausible answers, which are seen in the way scores get deﬁned
in practice.
The time-honored tradition has been to award the prize to the contestant with
the highest score. We call this the “deterministic” scheme, though it is deter-
ministic only in the scores, and not necessarily in the effort undertaken by the
contestants, since scores may be a random function of effort. But, in principle,
the prize could be given with different probabilities to the contestants based upon
the scores that they achieve. This opens up a wide class of schemes (see Section
10) of which the deterministic scheme is just one instance. The “proportional”
scheme, which we juxtapose to the deterministic, awards the prize to all the con-
testants with probabilities that are proportional to their scores. This is tantamount
to putting up a bunch of “lottery tickets” at the market, which the contestants can
then “buy” with their scores. The use of lotteries to award prizes is extremely
widespread in practice (a Google search yielded 3,390,000 results) and has been
discussed in the theoretical literature starting with Tullock (1975) in the context
of lobbying (see Section 1.1). However, to the best of our knowledge, it has not
been studied in the “moral hazard” context of our paper where only the stochastic
outputs of agents are observed and their efforts are not.
The proportional scheme is our proxy for awarding the prize in a manner that
is less drastic than deterministic and more commensurate with performance. In
its neighborhood lie many other schemes which will inherit its properties. So,
for our purposes, it does not matter precisely how scores are deﬁned, so long as
they remain “relatively bounded” across the different deﬁnitions. (See Remark 2
in Section 8.) Needless to say, if performances are incapable of being sensibly
quantiﬁed by scores, and can only be ranked, then the proportional scheme has no
meaning and only ordinal schemes make sense.
If the aim of the scheme is to “create competition” and to get the contestants to
strivehard, thenwearguethatonbalancetheproportionalschemeoutperformsthe
deterministic. Of course, were the contest designer to have detailed knowledge of
the distribution of the characteristics of the contestants (i.e., their ability, aversion
to effort, valuation of the prize), then he could come up with a carefully tailored
scheme which is optimal among all schemes conceivable. (In section 10 we carry
out such an exercise.) But often such knowledge is not at hand. The purpose then
is to design a robust scheme, which is based solely on observable outputs and yet
does well over a wide range of possible distributions “for generations to come”.
Both the deterministic and the proportional schemes are robust but, as was said,
the proportional scheme elicits more output.
3The intuition for this is crystal clear and best brought out with two agents who
have complete information about each other’s characteristics. (We show, in sec-
tion 11, that our results are not marred when there is incomplete information, i.e.,
each agent is informed only of his own characteristics and has a probability distri-
bution over those of his rivals.) Suppose the two agents’ abilities are sufﬁciently
uneven. Then the weak agent will not be able to overtake the output produced by
the strong, even if he works hard. Since work is costly, he will tend to slacken.
This, in turn, will cause the strong to also slacken since he can continue to win the
prize with good probability even at low effort levels. The upshot is an equilibrium
at which effort and output are low. In contrast, the proportional prize generates
better incentives. By working hard and producing more output, the weak agent is
able to achieve a decent increment in his probability of winning a prize, regard-
less of the fact that his output always lags behind his rival’s. Thus he is inspired to
work and creates the competition which also spurs his rival to work, culminating
in an equilibrium where effort and output are high. That an egalitarian scheme,
which distributes rewards commensurate with output produced, will often gener-
ate better incentives than an elitist scheme in which the rewards are reserved for
the top few ¡ this, in our view, is a theme of wide-ranging application and runs
like a leitmotif in the design of mechanisms in several different contexts (see, e.g.,
Dubey and Geanakoplos (2005), Dubey and Haimanko (2003), Dubey and Wu
(2001) where this theme has been explicitly emphasized.)
On the other hand, when abilities are more evenly matched (think of athletic
stars competing in the Olympics), the deterministic prize will clearly elicit more
effort. For if both work, they come out with nearly equal probabilities of win-
ning the prize under either scheme. But if anyone slackens, his probability drops
abruptly to zero under the deterministic scheme, while it drops less under the pro-
portional scheme. Thus there is more to lose by slackening when the deterministic
prize is in use.
Now if agents’ characteristics are picked at random from a sufﬁciently dis-
persed set X, the probability that they are unevenly matched is high, so that the
proportional scheme outperforms the deterministic scheme on average2. This is
certainly true if agents’ characteristics are picked independently from X as we of-
ten postulate for mathematical convenience. But in fact it remains true much more
generally, indeed so long as their characteristics are not heavily correlated or, to
put it more graphically, the distribution is not concentrated in a small neighbor-
2Even more: when the proportional prize beats the deterministic (which happens frequently) it
is by a big margin; whereas when it loses, it is by a small margin.
4hood of the “diagonal”.
The details of our results are as follows. We shall couch them in terms of the
indivisible prize rather than the divisible pot of gold, though the two are com-
pletely isomorphic.
Let pD and pP denote the deterministic and proportional prizes; and let c de-
note the characteristics of the agents. In Sections 2 and 3 we describe the strategic
games GpD(c), GpP(c) engendered by pD, pP when agents have complete infor-
mation, i.e., each agent knows not only his own characteristics but also those of
his rivals. This seems a tenable hypothesis when they compete in close proximity
with each other.
Fix a distribution x of agents’ characteristics, obtained by picking them i.i.d.
from an underlying set X that admits enough “diversity”. Let F(c) be an arbitrary
selection of individually rational (IR) strategies in GpD(c) (for almost all c w.r.t.
x). Similarly let Y be an arbitrary Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategy selection for
GpP (or, in fact, a “Weak Nash Equilibrium” (WNS) selection, which is a some-
what looser notion - see Section 3). We show in Section 7 that the (expected, total)
output under F (as we vary c according to x) corresponds to high effort only by
an elite coterie K of high-ability agents, which is independent of the value v of the
prize and whose average size is a small fraction of the total number jNj of agents
if the noise on output is not too big. In contrast, the output under Y is of the order
of min fv;Ng, entailing work across the whole population (see Section 6), and
thus generally much higher than that produced under F (see Section 8). It also
follows from our analysis that, when pD is replaced by pP, the vast majority of
non-elite agents is made better off at the expense of the elite coterie, as of course
is the principal who is able to elicit more output.
In Section 9 we show a “regime change” between proportional and determin-
istic prizes (in terms of their efﬁcacy in eliciting output) as we vary the similarity
between the agents. It fully clariﬁes our intuition that the deterministic prize does
better when agents are evenly matched but worse when they are different. Then
we turn to the question of an optimal scheme (among all conceivable schemes)
when the principal knows the distribution of agents’ characteristics. This is a
somewhat subtle matter, as the reader can see from our analysis in Section 10.
Finally, in Section 11, we show that our theme remains intact when there is in-
complete information among the agents. (For the convenience of the reader, most
of the proofs have been put into an Appendix.)
51.1 Related Literature
There is a rich literature on lobbying, where agents put up bids of money and are
awarded the prize either via the proportional scheme or the deterministic scheme
( called often “lottery” or “all-pay auctions”, respectively). See, e.g., Tullock
(1975,1980), Hillman and Riley (1989), Ellingsen (1991), Rowley (1991,1993),
Bay, Kovenock and de Vries (1993,1996), Che and Gale (1997,1998), Nti (1999),
Fang (2002) and the references therein. In most of this literature agents are as-
sumed to have complete information about each other, and in all of it there is
no issue of “moral hazard”, i.e., the bids submitted by the agents are perfectly
observable.
The literature on tournaments is also vast and does often emphasize moral haz-
ard, i.e., observable outputs depend stochastically on unobservable effort. How-
ever proportional prizes do not seem to have received attention there. For tourna-
ments with a single prize, see Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983),
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Rosen (1986). Subsequent writers have considered
multiple prizes whose number and worth is ﬁxed prior to the contest, and which
are then awarded to the contestants based upon the rank-order of their perfor-
mance (Glazer and Hassin (1988), Broecker (1990), Anton and Yao (1992), Clark
and Riis (1998), Krishna and Morgan (1998), Bulow and Klemperer (1999), Barut
and Kavenock (1998), Moldovanu and Sela (2001)).
In both strands of literature, the focus is on analyzing Nash Equilibria (NE)
(which are often unique and susceptible of being described by explicit formulae,
given the special structural assumptions of the models).
What is new in our approach is that we compare the proportional and deter-
ministic prizes in the presence of moral hazard. Our setting is sufﬁciently general
so as not to preclude multiple Nash equilibria and to render it difﬁcult to write
explicit formulae for them (e.g., we assume nothing about disutility and produc-
tivity other than the fact that they are monotonic in effort in the appropriate sense).
Nevertheless we are able to show that the worst NE under the proportional prize
elicitsmoreoutputthanthebestNEunderthedeterministicprize. Infact, weshow
somewhat more than this, since our comparison is based on WNE and IR as ex-
plained before, which are looser notions than NE (indeed IR is something which
any solution concept, based on an arbitrary mixture of cooperation and compe-
tition, would be expected to satisfy). To the extent that this constrains agents’
behavior less, our comparison is that much stronger (more credible?). Of course,
the price we pay for our generality is that we stop at this comparison, and unable
to discern any ﬁner structure in agents’ behavior, which would come to the fore
6were one to conﬁne attention to NE, especially in scenarios where they are unique
(as happens in some of the structured examples we study).
2 The General Model
2.1 The Agents
Each agent in our model has access to a ﬁnite subset E ½ [0;1] of (fractional)
effort levels. We assume 0 2 E and 1 2 E. These represent no effort and maximal
effort respectively.
An agent may choose any effort e 2 E. In doing so, he incurs disutility d(e) ¸
0 and produces stochastic output given by a non-negative random variable t(e)
with ﬁnite mean m(e). (We allow for the possibility that the range of t(e) is
discrete, even ﬁnite.) Effort 0 incurs disutility d(0) = 0 and produces output
t(0) = 0 with certainty: it is just a proxy for “not participating” in the game.
Agents are driven to work by the lure of an indivisible prize, which is handed
out to them by a prinicpal. If an agent places valuation v > 0 on the prize, and is
awarded it with probability p, this yields him expected utility pv. (See, however,
Remark 2 in Section 8.)
The triple (d;t;v) characterizes an agent. We make throughout the following




ce < d(e) <Ce (1)
and
de < m(e) < De (2)
for all e 2 E nf0g.
(Note that, on account of weak monotonicity, there is no loss of generality in
supposing that all agents have the same set E of effort levels. The case of an
arbitrary allocation of subsets of E across agents is automatically included,
provided that 0 and 1 belong to each agent’s set.)
72.2 The Principal
SupposenowthatwehaveaﬁnitesetN ofagentswithcharacteristics(dn;tn;vn)n2N.
The principal cannot observe these characteristics, or the effort levels (en)n2N that
the agents might have undertaken; all he can see are the realizations t = (tn)n2N





where the component pn(t), of the vector p(t), denotes the probability with which
n 2 N is allocated the prize.
The principal is risk-neutral and cares only about the expected total output
produced by the agents. To this end he can devise different allocation schemes p.
The full class P of such schemes will be considered later in section 10. For the
present, we focus on two particular schemes. In both pn(t) = 0 for all n 2 N if
t = 0, otherwise agents would be rewarded for not participating in the game.
The ﬁrst scheme is familiar from practice: the prize is shared equally among






jW(t)j if n 2W(t) and t 6= 0
0 otherwise
(Note that pD is deterministic only in the outputs, not necessarily in the effort
levels.)
The other scheme is analytically simple to work with and, to our way of think-
ing, not without intuitive appeal. It amounts to handing out “lottery tickets” for






åk2Ntk if t 6= 0
0 otherwise
83 The Strategic Game
We suppose that, in addition to knowing p, the agents know each others’ charac-
teristics (dn;tn;vn)n2N. This seems to be a tenable hypothesis if agents compete
in close proximity with one another. (In Section 11, we consider the case when an
agent knows his own characteristics but is unsure about those of his rivals.)
Given (dn;tn;vn)n2N a strategic game is induced among the agents by the
principal’s choice of an allocation scheme p. The set of pure strategies of each
agent n 2 N is E. Any N-tuple of pure strategies e = (en)n2N gives rise to a
random vector (tn(en))n2N of outputs. The expected value pk of pk((tn(en))n2N)
represents the probability of k winning the prize and we deﬁne k’s payoff to be
Fk(e) = pkvk¡dk(ek)
Denote by G the mixed extension of this game; and by Sk ¼ S the set of
(mixed) strategies of k in G, i.e. Sk is just the set S of probability distributions
on E. (Without confusion, Fk(s) will continue to denote k’s payoff, when the
mixed strategy N-tuple s 2 Õn2NSn ¼ SN is played in G.)
4 Solution Concepts
4.1 Fixed Games
First we recall three standard concepts. For any s ´(sn)n2N 2SN, denote s¡n ´ ¡
sk¢
k2Nnfng 2 S¡n ´ Õk2NnfngSk.




for all n 2 N.
The choice s 2 S is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) of G if
Fn(s) = max
˜ sn2SnFn(s¡n; ˜ sn)
for all n 2 N.
The choice sn 2 Sn is strictly dominant (SD) for n in G if
Fn(sn;v) > Fn(u;v)
9for all u 2 Snnfsng and all v 2 S¡n.
Finally we introduce a weakening of the notion of NE which will be relevant
for us. The idea is to restrict the set of unilateral deviations available to an agent
n by only allowing him to shift probabilities (to whatever extent he wishes) from
his current strategy sn onto maximal effort 1. More precisely, denote
Sn(sn) = f ˜ sn 2 Sn : ˜ sn(e) · sn(e) for all e 2 Enf1gg




for all n 2 N. If the above holds with fsn;1g in place of Sn(sn), we say that s is
a very weak Nash strategy-tuple (VWNS). Here the agent n is only permitted to
shift all the probabilities from sn abruptly onto 1. (Notice that maximal effort 1
is the anchor for both these notions. Indeed 1´ f1;:::;1g is always a WNS in any
game and hence also a VWNS.)
Let us denote by IR(G), NE(G), SD(G), WNS(G), VWNS(G), the set of all
strategies that are IR, NE, SD, WNS, VWNS in the game G. It is evident that
SD(G) ½ NE(G) ½ IR(G)
and that
NE(G) ½WNS(G) ½VWNS(G)
reﬂecting the progressively stringent requirements of the deﬁnition as we go from
IR to NE to SD, or from VWNS to WNS to NE. (Note also that, obviously,
SD(G)6= / 0 implies SD(G) = NE(G) = a singleton set.)
4.2 Spaces of Games
Suppose characteristics c ´ (dn;tn;vn)n2N are picked from X £:::£X ´ XN ac-
cording to some probability distribution x on XN. (Throughout, as was said, we
assume that the underlying set X satisﬁes (1) and (2)). Fix an allocation scheme p.
Then any c 2 XN induces a mixed-strategy game among the agents (as discussed
in section 3), which we shall denote Gp(c). We wish to extend our solution con-
cepts to the space of games speciﬁed by x.
10Our focus will be on what happens for almost all c according to x (a:a:c(x)),
i.e., for all c except perhaps for those in a set of x-measure zero.
Let s : XN ! SN be a strategy selection. We say that s is a x-F-selection
under p (where F ´ IR or NE or SD or WNS or VWNS) if, writing sc for s(c),
we have sc 2 F(Gp(c)) for a:a:c(x).
5 Expected Output
Given a space of games (XN;x) what matters, from the principal’s point of view,
is the expected total output produced by s : XN ! SN. Recalling that mn(e) is the











6 Proportional Prize: Expected Output from Weak
Nash Strategies
6.1 Prelude
It is clear a priori that, for any c 2 XN and any scheme p, the total expected
output in Gp(c) cannot exceed jNjD since no agent produces more than D when
he chooses maximal effort e = 1 (see (2)). Also3, supposing vn = v for all n 2 N,
the total expected disutility incurred by the agents at any individually rational
strategy selection cannot exceed v, otherwise some agent is incurring negative
utility and would be better off not participating in the game. But then expected
total output (see (1), (2)) is at most Dv=c. Thus, the most this output can be is “of
the order of ” min(v;jNj).
3Given c = (dn;tn;vn)n2N, and a vector a ´ (an)n2N >> 0 of positive scalars, let c(a) ´
(andn;tn;anvn). Then the games Gp(c) and Gp(c(a)) are ”strategically equivalent” and all our
solution concepts remain the same for them. So w.l.o.g., scaling utilities appropriately, one could
imagine vn = v for all n 2 N.
11This is the ﬂavor of our estimate in Theorem 1 below, showing that the pro-
portional prize elicits a “decent quantum” of output from the agents.
6.2 A Precise Estimate
For c = (dn;tn;vn)n2N denote v(c) =minfvn : n 2 Ng and deﬁne
v = ess infx(v(c))
Assumption AI
v > DC=d
We now show that Weak Nash Strategies (WNS) elicit a decent quantum of
output under the proportional prize.
Theorem 1
Suppose Assumption AI holds. Denote emin ´minfe : e 2 E nf0gg. Let s be a








where Expx;s is as deﬁned in (4).
Proof: See the Appendix.
Remark 1: Somewhat more sharply




which is achieved at p¤ = B=(A+B) where A = pjNjdemin and B = (dv=C)¡D
A variant of Theorem 1 for Very Weak Nash Strategies (VWNS) may also be of
interest. Let assumption AI0 be the strengthening of AI obtained by substituting
2C for C. Then we have
12Theorem 10








where Expx;s is as deﬁned in (4).
Proof: See the Appendix.
It might help to see what Theorem 1 implies when the number of players in-
creases. The following immediate Corollary asserts that the expected total output,
elicited via WNS-strategy selections by the proportional prize, grows as fast as
the minimum value of the prize or the number of players, whichever is smaller
(modulo the very minor requirement, given in Assumption AI, no one values the
prize too low).
Corollary
Suppose the set of players is increasing, i.e., jNj ! ¥, and the corresponding
spaces (XN;xN) satisfy Assumption I with v(N) in place of v (and xN in place of
x). For each N, let sN be a xN-WNS-selection under pP. Then
ExpxN;sN ¸ O(minfjNj;v(N)g)
Proof: Obvious.
6.3 Variations on the Theme
6.3.1 Highly Valued Prizes
In Theorem 1, the maximum value ¯ v = maxfvn : n 2 Ng of the prize is allowed to
be quite small, and then ¡ as was already said ¡ it is not possible to get too many
agents to put in signiﬁcant work under any allocation scheme p, simply because
the disutility incurred jointly by them cannot exceed ¯ v. But the value of the prize
lies in the eyes of its beholders. Since we are speculating about populations of
agents with highly variable characteristics, who will compete under the scheme
pP “for generations to come”, we may imagine the scenario when all the agents
13are of a mind to place high valuations on the prize. Alternatively we can think of
the scheme pP being used to disburse a vast number of different indivisible prizes
to the same population of agents, and then focus on the case when the prize is
such that it happens to be valued by everyone.
Ineithersetting, themathematicalanalysisisthesame. For c =(dn;tn;vn)n2N
recall that v(c) = minfvn : n 2 Ng. We will show that, for sufﬁciently high val-
ues of v(c), maximal effort 1 ´ (1;:::;1) can be implemented in a progressively
stronger manner : ﬁrst as an NE, then as a unique WNS and ﬁnally as an “almost-
SD” of the game GpP(c). To set the stage for this, we need to put a constraint on
the space of games. (Recall that mn(e) denotes the mean of tn(e).)
Assumption AII
There exist universal positive constants b and D > 0 such that for a:a:c(x), if
c = (dn;tn;vn)n2N, then
mn(1)¡mn(e) > D
for all e 2 E nf1g and all n 2 N; and
tn(e) < b
for all e 2 E and all n 2 N
Theorem 2
Suppose Assumption AII holds. Then there exist thresholds v¤ and v¤ such that
for a:a:c(x):
1 is an NE of GpP(c) (5)
whenever v(c) > v¤; and
1 is the unique WNS; hence also the unique NE; of GpP(c) (6)
whenever v(c) > v¤.
Proof: See the Appendix.
Clearly there is a threshold ˜ v (between v¤ and v¤) above which 1 becomes the
unique NE of GpP(c). Moreover, there is another threshold above which it is pos-
sible to implement 1 almost as an SD. Fix e > 0 as well as c = (dn;tn;vn)n2N.
14We shall say that 1 is “strictly dominant ‘up to error e” in the game GpP(c) if
maximal effort is a strictly dominant strategy for each player, conditional on the
fact that his rivals’ total output is at least e, i.e.,
Fn(1jA) > Fn(snjA)








Suppose Assumption AII holds. Then for any e > 0, there exists v¤¤(e) such that
for a:a:c(x):
1 is strictly dominant up to error e (7)
in the game GpP(c), whenever v(c) > v¤¤(e)
Proof: See the Appendix.
7 Deterministic Prize: Expected Output from Indi-
vidually Rational Strategies
The following “Key Lemma” provides the crucial insight as to why the determin-
istic prize pD elicits limited output. Indeed it shows that only the most productive
agent, along with those who stand a chance of beating him, set the bound on the
output at any individually rational strategy-tuple.
Fix c = (dn;tn;vn)n2N. Denote by h an agent (the “hero”) who has maximal
mean output under effort level 1, i.e., for all n 2 N,
mh(1) ¸ mn(1)
(where, recall mn(e) is the mean of tn(e)). Deﬁne K(c) to be the set of agents
whose outputs at effort 1 have a positive probability of exceeding that of h, i.e.,
15K(c) = fn 2 N : Pr[tn(1) ¸ th(1)] > 0g
We shall show that the output under deterministic prize is commensurate with
jK(c)j. First we need
Assumption AIII
There exists a universal constant B such that for a:a:c(x), if c = (dn;tn;vn)n2N,
then for all n;k 2 N
vn
vk < B
and, moreover, tn(˜ e) º tn(e) whenever ˜ e > e, where “º” denotes ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance4.
Key Lemma
Suppose Assumption AIII holds. Then for a:a:c(x) we have
Exps(c) · 2jK(c)jB2CD=c
where Exps(c) is as deﬁned in (3)
Proof: See the Appendix.
7.1 Estimation of the Average Value of jK(c)j with i.i.d. Agents
A natural scenario is that agents’ characteristics are drawn i.i.d. from a sufﬁciently
“diverse” set. To this end, we introduce an additional constraint on our space of
games.
4Recall: tn(˜ e) º tn(e) if Probftn(˜ e) ¸ zg ¸ Probftn(e) ¸ zg for all z 2 Range tn(˜ e)[ Range
tn(e)
16Assumption AIV
1. Thereexista>0, b>0, e >0suchthat, fora:a:c(x), if c =(dn;tn;vn)n2N,
then for all n 2 N
² mn(1) ½ [a;b] ½ R++
² Support tn(1) ½ [mn(1)¡e;mn(1)+e]
2. As we vary c on XN according to x;mn(1) is i.i.d. across n 2 N with uni-
form5probability in [a;b].
We can think of e as the size of the random noise on output, and then the
“diversity” of agents’ characteristics is reﬂected for us in the fact that ˜ e ´ e=(b¡
a) is small.
Lemma 1





We are ready to state the main conclusion of this section.
Theorem 3









Immediate from the Key Lemma and Lemma 1.
5Any probability with a continuous density f on [a,b] would do. We take the density to be a
constant for ease of calculation.
178 Proportional Versus Deterministic Prizes
8.1 Expected Total Output
Theorems 1 and 3 enable an immediate comparison between the (expected total)
outputs elicited from WNS, IR strategy selections by pP;pD respectively. Fix, for
example, all the parameters c;C;d;D;b;B;a;v of the model (such that v > DC=d)
and suppose that Assumptions AI, III, IV hold. There exists a threshold ¯ e such
that, if e < ¯ e, then
Expx;s > Expx; ˜ s
for any x-WNS-selection s and x-IR-selection ˜ s. This is so because the lower
bound on output given by Theorem 1 is independent of the noise e, while the
upper bound given by Theorem 2 goes to 0 as e ! 0.
To get a better feel, it might help to consider a numerical example. Let
B=C=D=1, c=d=0.75, [a;b] = [1;11], jNj = 50, E = f0;0:5;1g, v = 12. In ef-
fect, there are two real effort levels (shirk=0.5, work=1), considerable diversity in
characteristics (measured by b¡a,C=c, D=d and less than 4% noise ´e=(b¡a)).
There are 50 agents but the prize is worth only 12 and cannot possibly incite more
than 12:(4=3) = 16 agents to put in effort 0.5 or more.
By Theorem 1, the output is bounded below by (1/2)minfjNjdemin;(dv=C)¡
Dg= (1/2)minf150=8;9¡1g = 4 at any WNS-selection under the proportional
prize. Ontheotherhand, byTheorem2, theoutputisboundedaboveby2B2CD=c(1+
(jNj˜ e=(b¡a))) < 4=3(1+50(0:04)) = 4 at any IR selection under the determin-
istic prize.
8.2 Welfare
When the deterministic prize is used only the players in the elite coterie K(c)
(whose size is 1+[jNje=(b¡a)] on average) get the prize with signiﬁcant prob-
ability under any IR strategy tuple. More precisely, the remaining players in
NnK(c) get the prize with probablity at most v(c)Båk2K(c)dk(1) (See the proof
of the Key Lemma in the appendix for this estimate.)
If the proportional prize is used then, at any WNS strategy tuple, not only does
the expected total output go up for the principal as we just saw, but each player
in N nK(c) wins the prize with much greater probability than before (at least
demin=jNjD ´ O(1=jNj) each, provided deminv(c)=jNjD > Cemin, i.e., provided
18v(c) >CjNjD=d). Thus for v(c) large enough, all the players in N nK(c), who
constituted the impoverished majority under the deterministic prize, suddenly ﬁnd
theirprospectsbrightenandareabletobecomewelloffbyworkinghard. Theelite
coterie K(c), of course, loses its status : the probabilities of winning the coveted
prize drops from O(1=jK(c)j) to O(1=jNj) for each of its members, though they
still must work so as to not lag behind the others. In short, the egalitarian distri-
bution engendered by the proportional prize inspires all agents to work hard and
considerably raises total output.
The principal and the impoverished majority N nK(c) should both applaud
when pP replaces pD ; or, rather, the principal can count on the unconditional
support of the majority when he institutes pP instead of pD, and need only worry
about having to brook the displeasure of the tiny elite coterie K(c).
8.3 Large N and i.i.d. Agents
If we let jNj increase in the i.i.d. setting of this section, then the proportional prize
will not only elicit more total output (compared to the deterministic) averaged
across c, but will in fact also elicit more output for c occuring with high proba-
bility. Precisely, thereisathresholde¤ suchthatife <e¤ thenthefollowingholds:
Assertion
For any d > 0, there exists m(d) such that if jNj > m(d) then
Exps(c) > Exp ˜ s(c) (8)
with probability at least 1¡d, where s(c) and ˜ s(c) are arbitrary WNS and
IR strategy-tuples in GpP(c) and GpD(c) respectively. (Indeed, by lowering the
threshold e¤, we may even strengthen (8) to
Exps(c) > MExp ˜ s(c)
for any M > 0.)
This is a straightforward consequence of the law of large numbers (viewed in
conjunction with Theorems 1 and 3) as the reader may easily check.
Remark 2 (Bounded Deviation). Suppose productivity functions tn are altered
to hn±tn for differentiable hn : R+ ! R+ and that the derivative of hn is bounded
19below by g¡1 and above by g for some positive constant g (independent of n).
Then it is clear that our results in this section will continue to hold. The alter-
ation can be absorbed by changing the lower and upper bounds in (2) from d;D to
g¡1d;gD.
In the same vein take any utility function for the prize which is of “bounded
deviation” from expected utility. Precisely, an agent’s utility from getting the prize
with probability p could be a function f(p) for which there exists positive con-
stants a and v such that a¡1pv · f(p) · apv. This also does not affect the tenor
of our results. It can be absorbed by replacing B in (6) by a2B.
Remark 3 (Multiple Prizes). One might wonder what happens when l · jNj
deterministic prizes are used instead of a single prize (i.e., the pot of gold is split a
priori into l successively smaller parts to be handed out to the agents with the top
l outputs; with some suitable postulate on how agents value fractions of the pot,
e.g., linearly).
When jNj = 2 it is evident that using two prizes is wasteful since the loser will
always get the second prize for free.
If there are l <<jNj prizes, then again the proportional prize will perform bet-
ter. The reason is as follows. Assume everyone works hard. Deﬁne l “heroes” by
the top l mean outputs (as in section 7); and then deﬁne the coterie K to consist of
those agents whose outputs have a positive probability of overtaking the weakest
hero. Arguing as in the proof of the Key Lemma, the maximal effort in K will
effectively bound the total output at any IR strategy-tuple, regardless of the values
of the l prizes.
Furthermore, as in Section 7.2, the expected size of K will be small. Thus the
proportional prize will outperform l deterministic prizes when l << jNj.
We plan to explore the case of general l in future work.
9 Regime Change (Two Agents with Variable Noise
in Output)
We devote this section to an example which brings out our central theme: if agents
are “similar” then the deterministic prize elicits more output, otherwise that dis-
tinction goes to the proportional prize. To this theme, one may adduce one more
observation: if agents are chosen “at random” from a “sufﬁciently diverse” set
of characteristics, then the probability that they are similar is small. The upshot
20is that the proportional prize elicits more output on average, as our analysis has
revealed.
To better illustrate our theme, it will help to suppress the random choice of
agents’ characteristics. Thus our example is going to be particularly simple. There
are only two agents i.e., N = f1;2g and only two effort levels (besides the “0”
which is tantamount to not participating in the game), i.e., E = f0;1=2;1g. For
simplicity ﬁx d1(1=2) = d2(1=2) = 0 (which is just a proxy for a very small pos-
itive number) and d1(1) = d2(1) = d > 0. Fix also two numbers 0 < a < b. We
shall vary the productive abilities tn
e of n = 1;2 with a parameter e. For effort
level 1=2, both agents produce output uniformly in the interval [0;e]. For effort
level 1, agent 1 produces uniformly in [a;a+e] while agent 2 produces uniformly
in [b;b+e]. Since a < b, agent 1 is weaker than agent 2, and the “dissimilarity”






. As e increases
from 0 to ¥, D(e) falls from 1 (complete disparity) to 1=2 (complete similarity).
We may think of the e-spread a “noise” which, when large, overwhelms the in-
trinsic difference b¡a in the agents’ abilities and makes them very similar.
Taking our cue from Theorem 2, our goal is to implement 1=f1;1g as an NE.
For simplicity we suppose v1 = v2 = v and inquire about the values6 v of the prize
for which p = pD or pP implements 1 as an NE given e. Indeed, since we have
ﬁxed d1 and d2, and are going to deduce v, the only exogenous variable is e which
deﬁnes the productivity functions t1
e(e);t2
e(e). Thinking of c ´ (dn;tn
e)n2f1;2g as
the “precharacteristics” of the agents, the space from which c is chosen will be






: a · e · b
ª
. (Notice that the same
noise e is used for each agent.)
For any given c ´ (dn;tn
e)n2f1;2g ¼ e and v1 = v2 = v, we have the game
Gp(e;v) where p = pD or pP. A little reﬂection reveals that if 1 is an NE of
Gp(e;v), then 1 is also an NE of Gp(e; ˜ v) for all ˜ v > v. Thus we can measure the
“efﬁcacy” of p by the smallest value v(p;e) of v for which p implements 1 as an
NE, given precharacteristics e. This is given by
v(p;e) = inffv 2 R+ : 1 2 NE(Gp(e;v))g
First let us restrict to the situation when a = b, so that X(a;b) ´ X(e) is a
singleton. We shall show that there is a threshold e¤ (which depends on a,b) such
6This is not to say that the principal can strategically vary the value v of the prize ¡ that value
is not his to vary; it lies in the eyes of the agents who behold the prize. We, the analysts, vary v in
order to pinpoint the population of agents (or, of prizes) for which a given p implements 1 as an
NE.
21that a “regime change” occurs there:
v(pP;e)¡v(pD;e) =
(
+tive if e < e¤
-tive if e > e¤
i.e. the proportional prize pP beats the deterministic prize pD when the agents are
in [0;e¤), i.e., are sufﬁciently dissimilar, whereas it loses to pD when similarity
sets in for e > e¤. In our example, for a = 2 and b = 3, e¤ ¼ 2:8. Thus if one
restricts noise so that the output of “shirk” (e = 1=2) cannot overtake the output
produced by the strong agent (n=1) when he “works” (e=1), then we must have
e < 3, implying that pP beats pD with probability 2¢8=3 ¼ 0:93 (assuming all e
in [0;3] to be equally likely); if the overtaking can occur with probability at most
0:2, then e ¡3 < 0:2e, i.e., e < 3=:8, in which case pP beats pD with probability
2:8=(3=:8) ¼ 0:7.
Let us verify the existence of the threshold e¤. For the game on (N;X(e)),
let D¯ pn
D(e) = increase in probability of winning the prize for n, when he switches
from effort e = 1=2 to e = 1 (assuming that his rival is at e = 1, and that the
deterministic prize pD is being used). Similarly, deﬁne D¯ pn
P for the proportional


















Denoting the two minima by minD(e) and minP(e) respectively, we see that
minP(e) > minD(e) () pP beats pD
minD(e) > minP(e) () pD beats pP




























































yln(c+y)dy). And D¯ p2
P(e)
is an identical expression, obtained by swapping a with a+1.
We may now (with the help of MAPLE, and taking a = 2 and b = 3) plot
minD(e), minP(e) and minP(e)¡minD(e) against e in Figures 1, 2, 3 below. In












Turning to broader spaces X(a;b) with a < b, ﬁrst notice that D¯ p1
D(e) = 0
if e · 1 (for in this case agent 1 always produces below b, while agent 2 always
produces above b with effort level 1). Thus v(N;pD;X(a;b))=¥ if a <1. Since
Dpn
P(e) > 0 for all e and n 2 f1;2g, v(N;pP;X(a;b)) < ¥. It follows that pP is
better than pD for all (a;b) if a < 1. This is also true by our earlier discussion if
b < e¤ ¼ 2:8.
Figure 3 further reveals that when pP beats pD, it does so most of the time by
a large margin (e.g. by more than 0.1 for 0 < e < 2); whereas when it loses to pD,



















An alternative way in which to vary the productivities t1(1), t2(1) of agents







where the numerator is the standard normal distribution with mean (a+b)=2
and variance s2 and the denominator is the probability of the interval [a;b] un-




, conditional on being in [a;b].
Pick x i.i.d. according to ¯ N(s2) for each agent n, and let tn(1) be uniformly
distributed in (x¡e;x+e) (where e is suitably small and ﬁxed). As we increase s
from 0 to ¥, the chances of “similarity” between the two agents fall from maximal
24to minimal. There will be a threshold s¤ such that pP beats pD if, and only if, s >
s¤ (according to the ﬁrst criterion, or the third criterion, outlined in Section 6.1
with the threshold being higher, of course, for the ﬁrst criterion). The veriﬁcation,
being straightforward, is omitted.
10 The Optimal Allocation of a Prize
We shall consider the class P of all allocation schemes p : RN
+ ! [0;1]N which
satisfy the following conditions:
(i) (Scale Invariance)
p(rt) = p(t) for all scalars r > 0
(ii) (Anonymity)
For any permutation w : N ! N,
p(wt) = w(pt)
(iii) (Monotonicity)





if t 6= 0; and the sum is 0 if t = 0
The construction of an “optimal” scheme (deﬁned below) in P for a given
set X of characteristics (dn;tn)n2N is a delicate matter. We shall discuss it in
the simple setting of two agents (i.e., N = f1;2g) with binary effort levels and
deterministic7 output. The effort levels are “shirk” (e = 1=2) and “work” (e = 1)
— in addition, of course, to effort level 0 for not participating in the game. So E =
f0;1=2;1g. The disutility of effort is ﬁxed in c (with8 dn(1=2)=0 and dn(1)=d
7Our analysis will not be disrupted by the introduction of small noise: the optimal p¤ will
continue to be “approximately” optimal.
8We take dn(1=2) = 0 for simplicity (recall that dn is permitted to be weakly increasing, as
pointed out in footnote 1). But our analysis remains intact if dn(1) is sufﬁciently larger than
dn(1=2) > 0 (as can easily be checked.)
25for n = 1;2). What varies is the productivity of an agent. Let t(e;s) denote the
deterministic output of each agent when he exerts effort e 2 f1=2;1g and and is
endowed with “skill” s 2 [0;K], so that we may take X ¼ [0;K]£[0;K].
As in section 9, we shall take the implementability of maximal effort 1 as our
criterion, and accordingly deﬁne
v(p;c) = inffv 2 R+ : 1 2 NE(Gp(c;v))g
and
v(p) = supfv(p;c) : c 2 Xg
Thus v(p) is the smallest value v = v1 = v2 of the prize which implements 1
uniformly over X when the scheme p is used. We deﬁne ˆ p to be optimal in P for
X if
v(ˆ p) · v(p)
for all p 2 P. Our goal in this section is to construct such an optimal scheme.
For brevity, denote t(1=2;s) ´ t(s) and t(1;s) ´ t¤(s). We make some natural
monotonicity assumptions on t and t¤, along with a form of “decreasing returns
to skill”:
Assumption AV Both t : [0;K] ¡! R+ and t¤ : [0;K] ¡! R+ are






whenever s0 < s
The displayed inequality says that the percentage gain in output, by switching
from shirk to work, is a weakly decreasing function of the skill s 2 [0;K]. It
simpliﬁes the analysis considerably. Indeed our goal is to incentivize an agent (of
skill s) to switch from shirk to work, assuming his rival (of skill t) is working.
The inequality above implies (see Lemma 2 in the Appendix) that our goal will be
achieved for every (s;t) 2 [0;K]£[0;K) if it is achieved for (s;K) and (K;s) for
all s 2 [0;K]; in other words, we need only to worry about incentivizing the agent
in the following two extremal cases:
26Case A His skill is s 2 [0;K] and his rival is working with skill K.














When an agent switches from shirk to work, his fractional output goes up from
r(s) to R(s) in Case A
˜ r(s) to ˜ R(s) in Case B
Denote q(s) = 1¡ ˜ r(s). It is clear from our assumptions that q > R > r and that
R(s) = 1¡ ˜ R(s);R(K) = ˜ R(K) = 1=2
It will be useful for us to introduce one more function, which captures the
simple form of p 2 P when there are only two agents.
Deﬁnition 1 A prize function is a weakly increasing function p :
[0;1] ! [0;1] satisfying
p(1¡x) = 1¡ p(x) for all x:
Thefunction pissaidtobeeffectiveatprizelevelv, if1=(work,work)
is a Nash equilibrium for any pair (s;t) 2 [0;K]£[0;K] of skills
of the two players in the associated game.
Note that Assumption AII implies that, if jNj = 2 and p 2 P, then there exists





, for n 2 N, whenever
t1+t2 6= 0 (justifying our name for p).
The following lemma will be useful.
Lemma 3 The prize function p is effective at level v iff for all s 2
[0;K] we have
p(q(s))¡d=v ¸ p(R(s)) ¸ p(r(s))+d=v










= 1¡ p(R(s)), p(˜ r(s)) = 1¡ p(q(s)), the ﬁrst
inequality becomes
p(q(s))¡d=v ¸ p(R(s))
which proves the result.
Deﬁne a sequence of points 0 = x0;x1;:::;xl in [0;1=2] by
xi =
½
R(0) for i = 1












and l is the smallest index i for which r¡1(xi) is undeﬁned. Note that since q;R;r
are all strictly increasing functions, so is r, and therefore x1;:::;xl is an increasing
sequence.





i=2l for xi · x < xi+1
1=2 for xl · x · 1=2
1¡ p¤(1¡x) for 1=2 < x · 1
Theorem 3
(i) Any effective scheme has prize level ¸ 2ld.
(ii) x ! p¤(x)d is an effective scheme with prize 2ld:
Proof Let p be an effective scheme with prize level v. Applying
Lemma 3 with s = 0; we get









. Then by Lemma 3 we get
p(r(x)) ¸ p(x)+d=v whenever x;r(x) 2 [0;1].
28Applying this formula repeatedly we get
1=2 = p(xl) ¸ p(xl¡1)+d=v ¸ ¢¢¢ ¸ p(x1)+(l¡1)d=v ¸ ld=v
which proves (i).
For(ii)weﬁrstshowthat, foranys, eachofthetwointervals[r(s);R(s)]
and [R(s);q(s)] contains some “jump” point xi. Indeed if x= r(s)




¸ r(x) > r(xi¡1) = xi;
hence xi 2 [r(s);R(s)]. The argument is similar for [R(s);q(s)]:
Now by the deﬁnition of p¤ it follows that
p(q(s))¡1=2l ¸ p(R(s)) ¸ p(r(s))+1=2l,
which is precisely the condition of Lemma 2 with v = 2ld:
11 Incomplete Information Game
Our main theme, namely that pP is better for the principal than pD when agents’
characteristics are sufﬁciently diverse, has been established under the hypothesis
that agents know each others’ characteristics. Now we show that the theme re-
mains intact even when information is coarsened in such a way that an agent is no
longer sure of the characteristics of his rivals.
Let E = f0;1g and N = f1;2g. Let dn(1) = 1 and9 vn = v > 1 for n = 1;2;
i.e., the uncertainty pertains only to the productivities t1; t2. Of course, tn
z (0)=0
as always, no matter what the “skill” z of agent n may be. Suppose that tn
z (1) is
uniformly distributed on the interval [z;z+e], where e is a measure of the noise
on the output. Furthermore suppose that the skills of the agents n = 1;2 are drawn
independently from the intervals [a1;b1] and [a2;b2], with uniform probability
(and that all this is common knowledge to the agents).
Since agent n is informed of only his own skill, a strategy for him is given by
a function
sn : [an;bn] ! [0;1]
9If v · 1 then the only NE in G¤
pD or G¤
pP is that both agents never work (since effort 1 costs 1
which cannot be compensated by any probability of winning the prize)
29where sn(x) is the probability with which n chooses effort 1 when his skill is
x.
For any prize allocation scheme p, the game of incomplete information G¤
p is
then deﬁned in the standard manner. (It depends not only on p but also on the
parameters v;a1;b1;a2;b2;e which we suppress because they will be understood.
Our focus is on p = pP or pD which we keep track of in our notation.)
First consider the case when there is ex-ante symmetry between the agents and
no noise
[a1;b1] = [a2;b2] = [0;1] (say); and e = 0
Let Fn
p((p;s0)jx) denote the payoff of n in the game G¤
p, when he chooses
effort 1 with probability p and his skill level is x, while his rival chooses the
strategy s0. (Thus, if n’s strategy is s, his payoff in G¤






since n’s disutility of effort stays constant at 1 while his probability of winning the
prize goes up11. Thus n’s best reply to s0 is to switch from 0 to 1 at some “thresh-
old” skill c, which solves Fn
p((1;s0)jc) = 0 i.e., denoting by sc the strategy
sc(x) =
(
1 if x ¸ c
0 if x < c
We see that sc is a best reply to s0 in the game G¤
p if Fn
p((1;s0)jc) = 0. We con-
clude that (sc;sc) is a12 (symmetric) NE in G¤
p if Fn
p((1;sc)jc) = 0. The unique


















pD and strictly in G¤
pP
11weakly in G¤
pD and strictly in G¤
pP
12also “the”, i.e., there is only one symmetric NE as the reader may easily verify.











When cP = 0, the right hand side of (10) is inﬁnity by L’Hospital’s rule while
at c = 1, it is 1. Since v > 1 the solution of (10) is cP < 1, hence we have
ln(1+cP
2cP ) > 0. Thus, for any v > 1, we deduce that cP > cD. In short, more
player-types are working at NE under pP than under pD and hence pP elicits more
expected output.
Now let noise increase (from 0 to inﬁnity), still maintaining the ex-ante sym-
metry of the agents (i.e., [an;bn] = [0;1] for n = 1;2). Arguing as before, it is
evident that threshold strategies will once again constitute NE. But for e large
enough, the symmetry between agents will obtain even ex-post (to any desired
level of accuracy) not just ex-ante, i.e., no matter what the realization of their
respective skills, the two agents are nearly evenly matched since the large noise
renders their skills irrelevant. In this event, as demonstrated in section 9, pD will
elicit more effort than pP. Indeed it is easy to verify (and we omit the routine
algebra) that there exists an ˜ e such that
cP(e) < cD(e) if e < ˜ e
and
cP(e) > cD(e) if e > ˜ e
which asserts that, unless the noise is so high as to make skills count for little
pP outperforms pD in games of incomplete information (exactly mirroring the
situation of complete information (see section 9)).
31Next let us consider the effect of allowing for ex-ante asymmetry of the in-
complete information. To this end, let [a2;b2] = [D;1+D] for 0 < D < 113 and
[a1;b1] = [0;1], i.e., agent 2’s skills are D-higher than 1’s, so that D denotes the
degree of asymmetry. For convenience, ﬁx the noise e = 0. Arguing as in the
ex-ante symmetric case (though, for more details, see Proposition 1 below), there
again exist thresholds cn
D(D);cn





stitute the symmetric NE of the games G¤
pD;G¤




for n = 1;2 and all D (unless v is so small that no agent ever works in NE¡
we implicitly eliminate such trivial NE by presuming v is high enough). Thus pP
always outperforms pD and, as anticipated, the superiority of pp becomes more
pronounced as the degree D of the asymmetry rises.
The exact calculations for the asymmetric case emerge from the following
proposition. Suppose an agent is informed that his rival’s output is uniformly
distributed in some interval [z;z+h] ½ R+ and that his own skill is x. Fix x
and think of z;h as variable. We will compute two critical values zD ´ zD(x;h),
zP ´ zP(x;h) such that the expected payoff of the agent is zero in G¤
pD, G¤
pP if
he chooses effort 1 and if z = zD, z = zP respectively. Since this payoff varies
inversely in z, the agent’s best reponse to the rival is to choose effort 1 if z < zD
and effort 0 if z > zD in the game GD (or, effort 1 if z < zP and 0 if z > zP, in the
game GP). The critical values zD, zP are given in proposition below.
Proposition 1 The critcal z-values are zD = x¡h=v and zP =
h
exp(h=vx)¡1 ¡x .
Moreover we have x(v¡1)¡h · zP · x(v¡1).
Proof. First consider pD: Then z=zD implies x =z+h=v, and thus the player
wins if the opponent’s output lies in the interval [z;z+h=v]. This event has prob-
ability (h=v)=h = 1=v and gives expected payoff v(1=v)¡1 = 0:


















13If D > 1 then we have the trivial situation that the highest skill-type of 1 cannot beat the
lowest skill type of 2 which renders the deterministic prize ineffective, while the proportional still
continues to elicit effort.






the payoff under pP is xv
x+y¤ ¡1 = 0. Thus if z+h < y¤ the payoff at each y in
[z;z+h] is ¸ 0, which implies zP ¸ y¤ ¡h. Similarly if z > y¤, the payoffs in
[z;z+h] is · 0, which implies zP · y¤:
We leave it to the reader to see how our results for the asymmetric case can be
straightforwardly derived from this proposition. In fact, this proposition sufﬁces
also for the analysis of games of “partial information” which lie between what
we, following others, have called games of “complete” and “incomplete” infor-
mation. To be concrete suppose [an;bn] is partitioned into k (say, equal) subinter-
vals [an+iD;an+(i+1)D] where D = (bn¡an)=k and i = 0;1;2;:::k¡1. (When
k = 1 we have “incomplete” information and as k ! ¥ we converge to “com-
plete” information.) Each agent is now informed of his own exact skill and of
the subinterval of [an;bn] in which his rival’s skill lies. This deﬁnes a game of
partial information in the obvious way (from his initial probability distribution on
[an;bn], the agent can infer conditional probabilities of his rival’s skill given the
subinterval of [an;bn] in which it must lie).
We have not done the exact calculations, but it seems reasonably clear that pP
outperforms pD for every k not just for the two extreme points k = ¥ and k = 1
that have already been checked.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
For brevity denote Exps, deﬁned in (3), asY, i.e.,Y is the random variable which
gives the expected total output of all the agents in N; and denote its expectation
Expx;s, deﬁned in (4), as ¯ Y. For 0 < p < 1, consider the event




It is evident that x(E) ¸ 1¡ p. Denote
F = fc 2 E : 9k 2 Ns:t:sk
c(0) > 0g
33If x(F) = 0, every agent produces expected output at least demin almost ev-
erywhere in E, and so
¯ Y ¸ (1¡ p)jNjdemin (11)
If x(F) > 0, then there is an agent n such that x(Fn) > 0 where
Fn = fc 2 E : sn
c(0) > 0g
At each c 2 Fn, let agent n unilaterally change his strategy by shifting prob-
ability sn
c(0) from effort 0 to effort 1. Since n gets the prize with probability 0





















Thus we have shown by (11) and (12) that




for all 0 < p < 1. This establishes Remark 1 and, taking p = 1=2 also Theorem 1.
Remark 3: Observe that the above proof does not work if s is a x-VWNS-
selection. For if the unilaterally deviating agent n were to shift sn
c(e) wholly
onto 1 for all e 2 E nf1g, not just for e = 0, he may not stand to beneﬁt because
34² his increase in the probabilty of winning the prize when he switches from e
to 1, may be miniscual whenever e6=0 (becasue the probability was already
close to 1 when he chose e), while the cost dn(1)¡dn(e) may be signiﬁcant
² at the same time sn(0) may be very small compared to åe6=0;1sn(e), so
the gain in switching from 0 to 1 is outweighed by all the losses entailed in
switching from e 6= 0;1 to 1.
Thus in analyzing VWNS, we need to make sure that sn(0) is big enough (we
will ensure that it is at least 1/2 in the variation of the proof of Theorem 1 given
below).
Proof of Theorem 10
Let Y and ¯ Y be as in the proof of Thoerem 1. Consider the event
E = fc 2 XN :Y(c) < 2¯ Yg
It is evident that x(E) ¸ 1=2. Denote
F = fc 2 E : 9k 2 Ns:t:sk
c(0) > 1=2g
If x(F) = 0, every agent produces expected output at least (1=2)demin almost
everywhere in E, and so ¯ Y ¸ (1=4)jNjdemin, proving the theorem.
If x(F) > 0, then there is an agent n such that x(Fn) > 0 where
Fn = fc 2 E : sn
c(0) > 1=2g
At each c 2Fn, let agent n unilaterally change his strategy from sn
c to 1. Since




























Proof of Theorem 2
First let us a note an obvious fact which we shall use repeatedly. Let X be a
nonnegative random variable, with upper bound ˜ B and expectation ˜ M. Then, for
any a 2 (0;1) and M · ˜ M




To see this, denote the LHS by p. Then M · ˜ M · p ˜ B+(1¡ p)aM which yields
p ¸ (M¡aM)=( ˜ B¡aM).
We shall ﬁrst establish (5) of Theorem 2. Fix throughout c = (dn;tn;vn)n2N
for which the bounds in Assumption AII apply (such c occur with x-probability
1). For any k 2 N, let Y¡k ´ ån2Nnfkgtn(1) be the total output produced by the
players in N nfkg when they all exert maximal effort. For brevity, denote l ´
jNj¡1 ´ jN nfkgj. Then Exp Y¡k ¸ ld by (2). So, by Assumption AII and
(14)(taking M = ld; ˜ B = lb;a = 1=2 and noting that b > d) we obtain







Given any realization A>0 of total outputY¡k produced by Nnfkg, let player
k unilaterally deviate from effort e 2 Enf1g to 1. Then k0s probability of winning






















(The inequalities here follow from Assumption AII.) But A ¸ ld=2 with proba-
bility at least d=b by (15). Thus k0s gain in payoff, when he unilaterally deviates









On the other hand, his loss in payoff is at most dk(1)¡dk(e) · C. Thus, if we
choose v¤ >C=Z, the gain outweighs the loss and we conclude that 1 is an NE of
GpP(c), proving (5). (Notice that, since l ´ jNj¡1, we have Z ¼ 1=(jNj) which
implies v¤ = O(jNj) as expected from Theorem 1 according to which the total
expected output is O(min(jNj;v¤)).)
We now turn to the proof of (6). First let us establish that there exists v+ such
that, if minfvn : n 2 Ng > v+, then at any NE s of GpP(c) we have
Expt Y¡k ¸ ld=4 (17)
for all k 2 N. Suppose provisionally that (17) is false, i.e., Expt Y¡¯ k < ld=4 for
some ¯ k 2 N. Then
Pr(Y¡¯ k < ld=2) > 1=2 (18)
Clearly there exists n 2 N nf¯ kg such that sn(0) > 0 (otherwise Expt Y¡¯ k ¸ ld
contradicting our provisional hypothesis that Expt Y¡¯ k < ld=4.)
37Let n shift probability sn(0) from 0 to 1. His loss in utility, from the extra
work is at most sn(0)C. On the other hand, from (18) and Assumption AII, we















contradicting that s is a WNS of GpP(c), and thus contradicting also (18), and
thereby establishing (17)
Nowby(14)and(17)(takingM =ld=4;a =1=2; ˜ B=bl andnotingthatb >d
we derive







Consider any k 2 N and e 2 E nf1g. We shall show there exists v¤ such that, if
vk >v¤, thenk canimprovehispayoffbydeviatingfrometo1(assumingofcourse
that all the other players are producing some given amount ˜ A > ld=8). Indeed, in
view of (19) and (16) (using now ld=8 as the lower bound for A in (16)), k0s gain








jNj2b2:vk ´ ˜ Zvk(say)
while his loss is at most C. Thus it sufﬁces to choose v¤ >C=˜ Z. Since ˜ Z > Z, we
have v¤ > v+, proving (6).
Proof of Key Lemma
Since c ´(dn;tn;vn)n2N is ﬁxed, we shall suppress it and write K ´K(c). Imag-
ine the scenario when every agent in K chooses 1. This deﬁnes probabilities
pk
¤ > 0 for k 2 K to win the prize.
It is evident that (i)åk2Kpk
¤ = 1 and (ii)pk
¤ is independent of the mixed strate-
gies chosen by the players in N nK (each of whom gets the prize with zero prob-
ability in our scenario, since he is beaten for sure by the hero h). Furthermore,
38by Assumption A III(2), ¯ pk
¤ can only increase if any subset of players in K nfkg
change to strategies other than 1. Hence we deduce that every player k 2 K can
guarantee himself the payoff
pk
¤vk¡dk(1)
by playing 1. Thus, if s 2 IR(GpD(c)),
Fk(s) ¸ pk
¤vk¡dk(1)
for all k 2 K. But clearly Fk(s) · ¯ pk(s)vk (denoting ¯ pk(s) ´ k’s probability of
winning the prize when s is played), so we have




for all k 2 K, which implies
å
k2K











But then, putting v ´ v1 and observing B¡1v · vn · Bv for all n 2 N, we have
å
n2NnK




































39But each n 2 NnK can guarantee a payoff of at least 0 by choosing effort level 0,









sn(e)dn(e) · B2 å
k2K
dk(1)


























(using the fact thatC > c in the last inequality). The above two inequalities prove
the Key Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 1
Let 0 < e < 1 be ﬁxed.
For any n-tuple of real numbers x = (x1;:::;xn), we write M = max(xi) and
deﬁne Ne to be the number
of xi in the open interval (M¡e;M).
Claim 2 Suppose the xi are independent and uniformly distributed in
the closed interval [0;1]. Then Ne has the distribution min(n¡
1;B(n;e)), where B(n;e) is the binomial distribution.
40Proof For each k · n¡1; we calculate the probability Pr(Ne = k).
First suppose that k < n¡1; and let Ek denote the event that
fx1 is largestg_fx2;:::;xk+1 2 (x1¡e;x1)g_fxk+2;:::;xn 2 [0;x1¡e]g
For x in [0;1] the density Pr(Ekjx1 = x) is
x · e x > e
0 ek(x¡e)n¡k¡1dx
:
Integrating over x we get Pr(Ek) =
ek(1¡e)n¡k
n¡k . Considering the












However for k = n¡1 we get







and the result follows.
Corollary The expected value of Ne is E(Ne) = ne ¡en:


























ek(1¡e)n¡k¡en = ne ¡en:
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
41Lemma 2
Let s 2 (0;K) and t 2 (0;K), Then there exist s0 2 [0;K] and t0 2 [0;K] such that














Proof Since t¤ and t are strictly monotonic, there exist D > 0 and
D0 > 0 such that








Hence there exists a maximal pair D;D0 satisfying (20) and (21),
and then either s0 = K or t0 = K (otherwise both D and D0 could be
increased slightly, still maintaining (20) and (21), and contradict-
ing the maximality of D, D0).














as can be seen by dividing the numerator and the denominator of
the LHS, RHS of (22) by t¤(s0);t¤(s) respectively.
























establishing (23), and thereby (22)
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